Minutes from 8th Negotiation Team Meeting
(In Preparation for Annapolis)
Tuesday, 13th November 2007, 5h00pm
Mount Zion Hotel, West Jerusalem

Attendees:
Palestinian
- Ahmed Querei (AA)
- Yaser Abd Rabbo (YAR)
- Akram Haniyeh (AH)
- Dr. Saadi Kronz (SK)
- Zeinah Salahi (ZS)
- Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)

Israeli
- FM Tzipi Livni (TL)
- Yoram Turbovich (YT)
- Shalom Turjeman (ST)
- Gen Amos Gilad (AG)
- DG Abromovich (Abr)
- Tal Becker (TB)

Detailed minutes:

TL:
- I would like to suggest that we will continue according to what I tried to at the beginning of the session yesterday, but unfortunately while doing so we ended up in some sort of a discussion. At the end of today’s meeting the minimum that is required is some sense of the six or seven points that you stated that need to be in the document. Just [a] list [of] what is agreed or not agreed. Put aside the core issues for now, just have a list of agreed and not agreed, in points. If we have this agreement… let’s not include the areas of disagreement now.

AA:
- [Suggests an I and P paper]

TL:
- Ok I think that this is a very good idea about all of the issues. I think that when this comes to the core issues [however] this is problematic. Let’s start with all the other issues then go from there. Because when we get to the core issues you will start with yours I will start with ours [i.e. positions]. This is our duty to do, so but it will not help us to do so now.

[Discussion continues on this a bit more.]
TL:
- I think that [putting down all of this for the non-core issues] is important because this part is more about process. When it comes to the core issues, putting the basic positions of the Israelis and the Palestinians will not help. Therefore let’s start with the others.

AA:
- We can finish tonight the subjects – the preamble. What are the components. Not the language or the nice words etc. We should focus on three things in the preamble. One is the terms of reference [“TOR”]. The three core elements in addition to the [nice] language. One is the TOR. Second is the 2 state solution. Third is the Roadmap [“RM”]. Is there anything to be added to the preamble?

TL:
- No – it’s ok. And what we called before some good words. The basic idea of where we are going. End of conflict, [the goal is] to find a way to do so… something like this.
- So if you want to summarize the positions, this is something we did in our former conversation. When it comes to the TOR we want reference to 242, 338, the RM and other agreements agreed between the two sides. You added, and this is the problem, the API, international law, 1515, 1397, and 194. And we wanted the three principles of the Quartet.

SE:
- Do you have differences on 1515 and 1397?

TL:
- Yes.

AA:
- Basically you want 242 and 338?

TL:
- Yes… basically we can refer to the RM as it is. The RM and previous agreements as adopted by both sides. President Bush’s vision -- I forgot it before. The 3 principles of the Quartet. [AA asking clarification questions throughout.]
- Do you agree these?

AH:
- The three principles… we cannot include it as it is.

[It was agreed by both sides that we can find another place/way to include the three Quartet principles. TL suggested the same for the API. She reiterated the point that]
including the API is like including the Israeli declaration of independence – both are similarly one sided in their view of a resolution to the conflict.]

TL:
• Ok. I would suggest we find a place for the API, not as part of the TOR but in another place.

AA:
• I think that this is a mistake for Israel. It is the only real compromise from the Arab world.

TL:
• We can find another place for it… it is not part of the TOR.

AA:
• This is a main principle. Part of the TOR. This is what will make the Arab states come.

[Recap the points.]

AA:
• International law?

TL:
• NO. I was the Minister of Justice. I am a lawyer…But I am against law -- international law in particular. Law in general.
• If we want to make the agreement smaller, can we just drop some of these issues? Like international law, this will make the agreements easier.

[TL made the point that Palestinians don’t really need international law. Palestinians protest this assertion. AA raises examples of where it is important, such as water, and that it is key for the parties to agree what the permanent status agreements will be based on. Abr says that the agreement will be whatever is agreed at the table. At one point during this discussion, SE raises a problem with the “as adopted” language with respect to the Roadmap and previous agreements, noting that this would encompass the Israeli reservations which is not acceptable to the Palestinian side.]

AA:
• Second is about the two state solution.

TL:
• Two states is the ultimate goal of the process. But also part of the TOR.
• Each state is the answer to the natural aspirations of its people.

SE:
• [Raises RM language regarding unequivocal duty to accept each state as is. Reads from the RM.]

TL:
• To say the idea that two nation states contradicts the RM…

SE:
• [But we’ve never denied Israel’s right to define itself.]
• If you want to call your state the Jewish State of Israel you can call it what you want. [Notes examples of Iran and Saudi Arabia.]

TL:
• I said basically that our position is a reference to the fact that each state is an answer to the national aspirations of their people.

AH:
• There was an article in Haaretz saying that Palestinians would be stupid if they accept this [i.e. the Jewish state].

TL:
• Someone wrote the Palestinians?

AA:
• I want to say two state solution living side by side in peace security stability and prosperity, Palestinian democratic state independent with sovereignty, viable with East Jerusalem as its capital.

TB:
• That’s all? [Sarcastically.]

AA:
• Yes that’s our position.
• Two state solution living side by side in peace security stability and prosperity, Palestinian democratic state independent with sovereignty, viable with East Jerusalem as its capital.
• This is what we want to have. This small sentence.

TL:
• Since we are talking about two states, and since we agree that we shouldn’t refer to internal things for each and every state…
• I just want to say something. [Responding to a sarcastic question about whether the problem with the Palestinian suggested formulation is because Israel does not want a democratic state.] Not that there is a reference to being a democracy. [AA: if you don’t like it…] No, there are those that would like it a lot. Our idea is to refer to two states for two peoples. Or two nation states, Palestine and Israel living side by side in peace and security with each state constituting the homeland
for its people and the fulfillment of their national aspirations and self determination...

AH:
- This refers to the Israeli people?

TL:
- [Visibly angered.] I think that we can use another session – about what it means to be a Jew and that it is more than just a religion. But if you want to take us back to 1947 -- it won’t help. Each state constituting the homeland for its people and the fulfillment of their national aspirations and self determination in their own territory. Israel the state of the Jewish people -- and I would like to emphasize the meaning of “its people” is the Jewish people -- with Jerusalem the united and undivided capital of Israel and of the Jewish people for 3007 years... [The Palestinian team protests.] You asked for it. [AA: We said East Jerusalem!] …and Palestine for the Palestinian people. We did not want to say that there is a “Palestinian people” but we’ve accepted your right to self determination. Now I have to say, before we continue, in order to continue we have to put out Jerusalem from your statement and from our place. We have enough differences, without putting another one out there.

AA:
- Why is it different?

TL:
- The whole idea of the document is to launch negotiations on final status issues, one of them is Jerusalem. I know what is the Palestinian demand. You know the Israeli position. If we want a joint statement we should find common ground. And Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive issues. Jerusalem is one of the core of the core of the core issues.
- In the preamble anyway adding the issue of Jerusalem cannot lead to something [that we will agree]. If this is trying to do a tradeoff between Jerusalem and the national aspirations it is not the same at all.
- I didn’t ask for something that relates to my own self. I didn’t ask for recognizing something that is the internal decision of Israel. Israel can do so, it is a sovereign state. [We want you to recognize it.] The whole idea of the conflict is … the entire point is the establishment of the Jewish state. And yet we still have a conflict between us. We used to think it is because the Jews and the Arabs… but now the Palestinians… we used to say that we have no right to define the Palestinian people as a people. They can define it themselves. In 1947 it was between Jews and Arabs, and then [at that point the purpose] from the Israeli side to [was] say that the Palestinians are Arabs and not [Palestinians – it was an excuse not to create a Palestinian state. We’ve passed that point in time and I’m not going to raise it. The whole conflict between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is not the idea of creating a democratic state that is viable etc. It is to divide it into two.] For each state to create its own problem. Then we can ask ourselves is it
viable, what is the nature of the two states. In order to end the conflict we have to say that this is the basis. I know that your problem is saying this is problematic because of the refugees. During the final status negotiations we will have an answer to the refugees. You know my position. Even having a Jewish state -- it doesn’t say anything about your demands. …. Without it, why should we create a Palestinian state?

AA:
- Can I have a minute to talk about the conflict?

TL:
- There is something that is shorter. I can read something with different wording.
- That the ultimate goal is constituting the homeland for the Jewish people and the Palestinian people respectively, and the fulfillment of their national aspirations and self-determination in their own territory.
- And we take Jerusalem off the preamble.

SE:
- I noted that. We took it out. That is your position we take honestly what you said.

AA:
- That is your position… in 1947 the UN issued its famous resolution to create two states for the Arabs and the Jews. In 1948, 194 came. [That whole time people were pushing for a one state solution – one secular state.] This was in 1968. From that date until 1988 this was the Palestinian position. In 1988 – the PNC of the PLO agreed the two state solution.

TL:
- What did you say in 1988? What is written in your decisions 1988?

AA:
- The acceptance of 242 and 338.
- And then we came to the negotiations – Jerusalem is part of the occupied territories since 1967. When we speak about East Jerusalem, when we talk about the core issues we will speak about the core issues in such a way that will keep all of the issues on Jerusalem [for later] when you say that East Jerusalem will be the capital of Palestine [we are addressing just the territorial element. Jerusalem can be divided into two elements – territory and arrangements. On arrangements there are many other aspects -- more than ten or eleven to discuss later.]

TL:
- I would like to ask something. There are two things you referred to. One is Jerusalem and the other is two states for two people. For Jerusalem, I want to state the obvious. [Talking about any core issue in the preamble cannot happen because we won’t reach an agreement on the preamble, on any core issue. We know your opinion.]
AA:
• [Refers to 181.]

TL:
• 181 is a matter of borders.
• If you say that two states for two people – [and that] the problem is that the borders are not defined yet [we can define it to come into effect once the borders are defined].
• This closes the circle. Two states for two people - then [include a] reference to the future Palestinian state. Without the borders agreed upon it constitutes nothing. By saying that the borders will be agreed [you protect yourself]. The vision is to end the conflict.

AA:
• Ok – let’s [move on].

[Discussion on technical procedure for drafting the joint document.]

TL:
• [Reads from 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence.] “Palestine is a state for Palestinians wherever they may be.”

AA:
• [You have your position, we have ours.] Let’s come to the RM. We have the 5 points.

TL:
• You know our position. At least delete immediate and parallel. And we want to change the trilateral committee to something that will refer to the American judge and say that the American judge can invite whomever they want to.

[Reference to Yediot article on trilateral committee.]

AA:
• You want the trilateral committee to be a bilateral committee?

TL:
• No – we accept the Americans as the judge. And the judge can invite whomever they like. We can have trilateral meetings, but not a trilateral committee. … I think that the Americans can live with it.

AA:
• [Recaps Israeli position. Short side discussion on it.]
I took part in all the meetings of the trilateral committee. Dayton, Moscovitz, CIA, Wolfe, State Department... Except the White House I think all the [departments] of the US shared this comment. After the good morning, it was like court – the verdict was written before. Everyone spoke to the history, the record, and not the security. With Dayton, instead of dealing with security we dealt with prestige. We dealt with a power point war. By the way I think you won the power point war but we lost everything. We want to deal with security. In all the committees the idea was to impress the Americans and not to deal with security. The first committee is deteriorating. What we need here is some flexible mechanism that will deal with security if we are serious about security.

YAR:
- What is the mechanism you will suggest?

AH:
- We are not dealing with security only.

AA:
- We have many mechanisms that we want to activate that deal with more than just security. We are committed to all the bilateral mechanisms [between us that deal with economics, security, etc.] we are talking about the first phase of the RM. [We all have problems with it.] We want a trilateral committee to follow up on the commitments of both sides. This is why we need it to be parallel and immediate. This is why we need Israel to say tomorrow that we will freeze all settlement activity. [AH: This has nothing to do with security] Also we need to reopen the Jerusalem institutions which have been closed since 2004? [Side discussion on date of the closure] 2001. Also what is the problem to say that we will start to dismantle the outposts? That the decision [is] taken. To start. [Emphasizes seriousness of Palestinian efforts on security reform. If we succeed in Nablus we will move to Jenin. Also stresses Palestinian commitment and understanding to Israeli security and Palestinian security. We need it. You need it. We need the trilateral committee for this.]

ST:
- How is it different from what is in the RM, which includes a monitoring mechanism, and which we accept?

AA:
- We want something to follow up on [the obligations of both sides].

AG:
- [You are dealing with many issues. None of this deals with security as we define it. None of them are dealing with Hamas. Other major security issues. You are far away from dealing seriously with security. There is no intelligence cooperation about terror. And that is what happened in Gaza. And instead of dealing with terror – you showed us power point presentations that showed us
how you behaved beautifully and did nothing about security. And we paid for this failure with hundreds of deaths. We don’t want the trilateral meetings to focus on issues like settlements, etc. We need something to deal with real security issues.]

SE:
- [This is the logic of having the US as the judge. To tell Palestinians if they are not serious, and to guide them along.]

AG:
- [But you saw what happened with Dayton!]

TL:
- We understand your concern [that we will use the RM as an excuse and with the difference of opinion over internal sequencing in the phasing. To deal with your concerns we agreed to the American judge. Another thing – the judge will refer to the implementation of the obligations of both sides, not just the Palestinian obligations.] Because of the [past experience of our MOD, our experience has been] that it doesn’t help. And since the 3rd party can invite to the meetings anyone he wants... And therefore [knowing the Americans if you ask them to call a meeting with all the three sides, they will do so. Therefore this should be sufficient to answer your concerns and it is easier to accept for us.] Anyway when it comes to the Israeli implementation of the RM, to find out whether we froze the settlements or not -- it is a decision – we don’t need a trilateral committee or meetings on this. [The Americans can call us in on this in one day.] Anyway the trilateral committee doesn’t help on these things. [TL raises the issue of CBMs again, and asks to defer all of this until the creation of a list of CBMs that sends the right message to the Palestinians.]

AA:
- If you allow me to [explain] and to ask for an explanation. You know that all of our problems come from two things. One is territory, the other is the freedom of the people. [These have not been achieved. I respect AG when he says that [total security reform] has not happened…]

TL:
- At the end of the day it is our decision and not [inaudible].

AA:
- Exactly. And since 2003 – do you need to expand [the settlements]? [TL: No.] But it has continued. I can give you maps, etc. We need freedom of the people and the territory. Because of these concerns – this is the real concern. I recognize that your concern is security. [Continues along same lines and the seriousness of Palestinians with respect to security.]
• Can I add to what AA said? I will take the points that AG said, not to satisfy you but to satisfy the [Palestinian] people. The RM states that Palestinians and Israelis will resume security cooperation based on the Tenet plan. [Describes the Tenet work plan, which includes a trilateral committee.] AA is basing his argument that everything that we are doing on security is in line with this.

ST:
• So if it is there why do you need to say it?

SE:
• [Because it is not functioning and I need it give it a fresh start.]

TL:
• Basically the RM refers to the cooperation between the two sides and doesn’t say anything about the trilateral committee [SE protests]. I don’t want to reinvent the wheel. [We accept the RM as it is. There will be bilateral and trilateral meetings. I don’t know why it is so problematic to accept but this is our position.]

[Discussion continues on the importance of the trilateral committee and the seriousness of the Palestinians on security. AH notes that it is insulting that Israel is not acknowledging the seriousness of Palestinians with respect to security. Look at what Palestinians are doing with Hamas!]

TL:
• I’d like to say something to AA about the settlements. Just like you said you understand our security needs. I understand the sentiments of the Palestinians when they see the settlements being built. The meaning from the Palestinian perspective is that Israel takes more land, that the Palestinian state will be impossible, the Israel policy is to take more and more land day after day and that at the end of the day we’ll say that it is impossible we already have the land and cannot create the state. [It was the policy of the government for a really long time. Now it is still the policy of some of the parties, but not the government. On the borders – we have a distinctions between blocs of settlements and individual settlements. Some are not even in our interest to expand. This is why we haven’t built new settlements. This is why it is important -- the dismantling of outposts is important for us as a government but this creates some difficulties as well. If it interests you the way Israelis see the situation… In the past there are those that felt that each day that passes while we are holding part of the land is another victory because we are holding the land. We made our choice – the most important thing is not more Jews living in all of the land, but the most important thing is the existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. And for this we decided that we needed to divide the land and to live in a smaller, Jewish and democratic state. And by doing so to give the Palestinians the [right to self determination]. [Since 2004 we stopped subsidies to settlements. As Minister of Housing we refused to be in Kiryat Arba and other sensitive places because it is against the internal structure in Israel. It is not in our interest to keep taking on
one hand and to talk peace on the other. But you have not seen expansion beyond
the existing settlements.]

ST:
  • What is happening is through private sector.

TL:
  • There has not been the confiscation of land. [Palestinian side protests at this
    comment, and notes the confiscations that happened one the same days as the first
    negotiation sessions.] Well there is the matter of the Wall.
  • So let’s continue. Would you like to continue to other issues?

YAR:
  • Well did we close the issue of security, settlements, etc…?
  • [Israeli side says no.]
  • But I really wanted to ask just for the sake of clarity. The conclusion I get is that
    you want to make security on your own without our cooperation or anything.

YT:
  • I will phrase what AG said. At the moment Gaza is a country of terror. You
    regret it and we regret it. In the WB there is a very good cooperation between
    you and us, headed by Salam Fayyad who we tremendously respect, [that has
    started but this takes time. AG said it was too early to judge the results or
    whether this reform has taken root. It is a good beginning. It is not that we don’t
    want cooperation – we do. We agreed the American judge. The only difference
    we have is over the procedure.]

YAR:
  • We are not talking about all issues. There will be bilateral daily issues between us.
    We are talking about the first phase of the RM. [Continues to explain.] There are
    two levels. [The trilateral and the bilateral do not contradict each other.]

TL:
  • [Asks why the Pals think that the formulation she suggested is less good than the
    trilateral committee.]

YAR:
  • Because we want a serious mechanism. Because you connected this to the
    implementation of the entire peace treaty in the future. Therefore we want a
    different mechanism where you and the US will not just come occasionally to
    check in.

YT:
  • You are preaching to the converted. [We agree – the difference here is just
    procedural. The objective person is a serious achievement for you.]
[Discussion continues on this.]

AA:
- I just want to say one thing – back to the settlements – we don’t want the territory and the people to be kidnapped. The settlements there are real and [there is] too much expansion. Second we are talking about settlement expansion – we are not talking just about the government expansion, but also the private sector.

TL:
- But you need to understand something about the process itself. When the government has [issued] the tender in the past it means that the private sector won the tender and then it has the rights on the land. They are entitled to work on the land that they purchased. Even in talking in terms of freezing the settlements – I’d like you to put some parameters a list on what is the most problematic from your perspective. New settlements is the most. Expanding the settlements is the second.

AA:
- In 1995 [raises the issue of the construction lines].

SE:
- What defines a settlement freeze, including natural growth. [Makes point that it doesn’t matter whether it is private or public, etc. The RM is clearly a freeze -- period -- without distinction. ] We all have our internal difficulties.

ST:
- Natural growth – what does it mean? If a family has a baby can it live in the settlement?

[SE begins to answer. TL interrupts to say: I respect your right to SD, respect my right to a Jewish state. ]

SE:
- If a child is born he has many alternatives. [AA’s son, on the other hand, living in Abu Dis cannot even build a bathroom.]

TL:
- You refer to the RM and the obligations on both sides. Your obligations on security will take some time. There are certain things that are crucial because there are things that make the settlements bigger, because it takes some of the land. I would like to share with you some of our problems – it’s not an excuse.
- The private sector – they have some rights in some places
- There are other places where they started. The child is born and the tractors are there on the ground. It takes some time, but they are there on the ground.
• It is not internal political issues – I think that we need also to understand – because the last thing that we want is to say something and you will say that you are even in violation with your own statement.
• You understand our position – we are not trying to expand to give you less in the end. Now we have to deal with what is on the ground. [We want to know what exactly it means if Israel takes this decision -- what exactly this will mean.]

[AA raises construction lines concept again. Discussion continues. TL again asks for help in defining a freeze.]

AA:
• Can we speak about the timetable? What we propose is that the peace treaty will be in President Bush’s term. We put a date that is seven or eight months.

TL:
• When is Bush’s term?

AH:
• January 2009 [elaborates].

TL:
• [Why do you say less than the full term?]

[Palestinians respond that you need a buffer zone of time and a target date. Discussion continues repeating the logic of the timetable from earlier meetings and whether or not a timeline was agreed. SE clarifies that timetable is to ensure commitment to achieve an agreement and not just to exert best efforts.]

AA:
• I want to talk about the day-after Annapolis. Let’s say that the day after Annapolis there will be negotiations, and we will start immediately with teams to deal with all issues of the PS negotiations – not just the six issues – to form a steering committee on all the committees, etc. there will be a committee, each to meet with the delegations, the parties, each three months to evaluate [progress].

ST:
• The Arab League? [joking]

AA:
• Amr Musa. [joking] To evaluate -- to see progress. After six months, we propose an international conference according to the RM.

TL:
• What do you mean according to the RM?

AA:
• The RM calls for two.

TL:
• You can refer to meetings – please don’t refer to the RM [with respect to the international conference].

[Joking about possible locations of international conference.]

AA:
• Fourth is the timetable. If you have anything else – maybe we can talk about the agenda of the negotiations.

[Palestinian side suggests one day after the meeting be dedicated to the first day of negotiations. TL thinks it is a good idea but has to check.]

TL:
• The statement will be adopted by the executive committee before or after Annapolis?

[Palestinian side responds before.]

[Discussion returns to the day after. YT and ST leave.]

TL:
• Now I am talking about what you suggested on the timetable. It was understood by Olmert that Abu Mazen agreed [to no timetable]. Since Olmert referred to the timetable in his speech, we can quote what was in his speech.

SE:
• [Notes again for the record that Abu Mazen did not agree this. Discussion on this continues. Abr also leaves.]
• Are we meeting tomorrow?

TL:
• My teams have left for two days, but we can meet the two of us or the four of us… [Referring to herself, TB, AA and SE]

TL:
• [Reads from Olmert speech.] “There is a chance that we can reach real accomplishments, perhaps even before the end of President Bush’s term in office.”
• Now referring to the day after, there are a lot of words that can represent seriousness [that should be included – I said that we need to ask about the first meeting, it sounds like a good idea.] We are not in favor of these follow up committees [especially if we don’t know who they are].
• I’d like to refer now to an easy thing – the role of the international community and the Arab world.
• We would also like to refer to [fact that] the process is a bilateral one. That there is no substitute for the bilateral process. We recognize that the international community in general and the regional and Arab and Muslim states in particular have a critical role to play in supporting the bilateral process as well as any agreement negotiated between the parties.
• And now we have some ideas about the support of the international community.
• International support to the legitimate PA – maybe this is the point where we can refer to the 3 Quartet conditions.
• I think that there should be a reference to the capacity building, economic development, a reference to Tony Blair’s mission or something.
• I would like to see something about the determined efforts to confront extremism, incitement, intolerance, weapons smuggling, cutting public and private funding to terror. All these things that we need especially from the Arab world to do so. I don’t know if the Arab world will have a problem with this.

YAR:
• We don’t want anyone to think it is directed against them.

AA:
• I think that there are international resolutions on this.

TL:
• [This is a way for the Arabs to be involved. Now this is where we can refer to the API] and to say something about the need to improve the regional ties and to promote regional cooperation [and to launch the multilateral committees] and until we have the real CBMs – I know it is a vague idea – I would like the Arab world to take steps -- as we take steps towards the Palestinians they take steps towards Israel [to help Israel help the Palestinians]. I know if the CBMs will not be serious – they will not do so.

TB:
• The three core parts are:
  • [Support for the bilateral process, fighting extremism and the API as part of regional cooperation.]

TL:
• [Notes that from their perspective the good parts of the API refer to peace and normalization with Israel at the end of the Road. She repeats that the goal of peace with the Palestinians is for its own sake, not for normalization. But the API includes parameters for the resolution of the core issues which is problematic for Israelis and cannot be part of the bilateral process between Pals and Israelis.] There are relevant references in the RM as it is. [Notes if you want a more concrete reference beyond what is in the RM to the API, this is the place to include it. Including the rest of the API is like including the Israeli declaration of
independence, which is also a one sided perspective on what peace should be. I would like to add one last thing. [Refers to her trip to Lisbon and a discussion with Amr Musa.] He said about the need to promote a process and a bilateral track which is important. Then he said that we have our own proposal and this is the API. So this is a proposal and not part of the bilateral…

AA:

- [Refers to 242] and that no party has the right to acquire territory by force. Egypt – you’ve withdrawn from every meter. Syria – they are ready and have [basically agreed the borders]. Why are you trying to make the Palestinians pay the price for all of this? Putting the API in this context does that.

TL:

- Of course we will have our future discussions on all these points.

AA:

- So if Israel is ready to withdraw completely from the Golan Heights…

[Refers to previous discussions on the Syrian track. AA notes that the API deals with regional peace and not just the Palestinian track; normalization with the Arab world is not cheap. TL responds that she respects the peace with the Palestinians very much and that including it in the TOR is basically like including its parameters as the parameters on the core issues themselves.]

SE:

- [Reads from six references to the Arab states in the RM. Reads again the language on the API and regional peace, no funding, restore pre-intifada links, viable multilateral engagement… etc.] But this all comes in the context of a comprehensive peace with the Arabs. [In 2003 the Arab and Islamic countries all met in Tehran and adopted the API. We cannot go to them now and try to get them to take these steps piecemeal or fragmented steps outside the concept of the comprehensive peace. The Arab states have all accepted the RM.]

TL:

- I understand the sensitivity – that many want Annapolis to be part of the regional peace initiative [Syria etc.].

YAR:

- If the Syrians don’t behave themselves in Lebanon for one week no one will care about them in the regional track.

TL:

- My understanding from discussions [with Jordanians etc.] is that the Arab league is very sensitive. If the problem is to put the discussions in the regional peace context – [I need to think of what the best way to do this is]. [Reiterates that the problem is that the API tries to resolve all the open issues on both sides.]
[It was agreed that the next meeting would be held between AA and TL, Wednesday at 12h30pm, at the King David. AA notes he will be traveling to Jordan the next day.]