The Palestine Papers
NSU Memo Re: Assessment of the Israeli Proposal on Territory

This memo assesses the Israeli proposal on borders/territory, based on information gleaned from the Israeli presentations of March 31, 2008 and April 7, 2008 and in subsequent meetings, as well as from joint field visits conducted by the two technical teams to several areas of the West Bank. Since the Israeli side has never presented a complete map or detailed proposal on territory, this assessment remains preliminary in nature. According to the memo, the Israeli side thus far has refused to present their vision for the Jerusalem area, insisting instead on a gap in the border from Qattana in the north to Battir in the south, or to clarify their position on the eastern border (i.e., the Jordan valley), which they insist be tackled only after security arrangements are agreed to. In addition, the Israelis have expressed an interest in annexing a number of additional areas which they claim are “adjacent” to the 1967 line, but have not specified where or what these areas are. Lastly, the Israeli proposal does not specify what areas from Israeli territory they are willing to cede as part of the swap. The Israeli proposal calls for the annexation of approximately 9% of the West Bank, largely along the lines of the current Wall route (April 2006). As such, the proposal is deeply and irreconcilably flawed, and cannot form the basis for a viable, contiguous or sovereign Palestinian state, much less for a comprehensive agreement that would end the conflict. In addition to consolidating the current fragmentation of Palestinian territory, the proposal would severely impede Palestinian urban and rural development, hinder economic growth and deprive the would-be state of vital land, water and other resources. More importantly, the proposal would result in the near complete encirclement and isolation of East Jerusalem,

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memorandum

TO: Palestinian Negotiating Team

FROM: Dr. Samih Al-Abed and NSU Territory Team

SUBJECT: Preliminary Assessment of the Israeli Proposal Following Joint Field Visitson Territory

DATE: 15 August 2008

 

 

  1.  Introduction

 

The following is an assessment of the Israeli proposal on borders/territory, is based on information gleaned from the Israeli presentations of March 31 and April 7 and in subsequent meetings, as well as from  joint field visits conducted with the Israeli Territoryby the two technical teams to several areas of the West Bank, as well as our own preliminary analysis of the proposal.  It should be noted, however, that since the Israeli side has never presented a complete map or detailed proposal on territory, this assessment remains preliminary in nature.  

 

In particular, the Israeli side thus far has refused to present their vision for the Jerusalem area, insisting instead on a gap in the border from Qattana in the north to Battir in the south, or to clarify their position on the eastern border (i.e., the Jordan valley), which they insist be tackled only after security arrangements are agreed to. In addition, the Israelis have  expressed an interest in annexing a number of additional areas which they claim are “adjacent” to the 1967 line, but have not specified where or what these areas are.1 Lastly, the Israeli proposal does not specify what areas from Israeli territory they are willing to cede as part of the swap.

 

In short, tThe Israeli proposal, which calls for the Israel?s annexation of approximately 9.2% of the West Bank,,2 largely along the lines of the current Wall route (April 2006).  As such, the proposal is deeply and irreconcilably flawed.  As it stands, and the Israeli proposal cannot form the basis for a viable, contiguous or sovereign Palestinian state, much less for a comprehensive agreement that would end the conflict.

 

In addition to consolidating the current fragmentation of Palestinian territory, the proposal would severely impede Palestinian urban and rural development, hinder economic growth and deprive the would-be state of vital land, water and other resources. More importantly, the proposal would result in the near complete encirclement and isolation of East Jerusalem, the future capital and economic epicenter of a Palestinian state, from the rest of the West Bank, effectively eliminating any notion of viability?economic, political or otherwise.

 

  1.  General Observations

 

Before discussing the field visits and the Israeli proposal itself, it is important to highlight a number of general observations regarding the Israeli approach to Territory negotiations.  In particular:     

  •  The The Israeli side continues to refuse to address borders and territory in a comprehensive and holistic manner..  Thus far, ; Most problematic in this regard is theiry refuseal to discuss the Israeli side has refused to discuss borders/territory in Jerusalem area (from Qattana in the north to Battir in the south). In addition, the Israelis refuse to clarify their position on the) and the entireor to clarify their position on the eastern border (i.e., the Jordan valley), which they insist should be tackled only after security arrangements are agreed to.
  •  The Israeli emphasis onuse of percentages is misleading. and misses the point. Official Israeli calculations on both territory and the number of settlers are is misleading because they exclude East Jerusalem and surrounding areas that were illegally annexed to Israel, as well as the Latrun No-Mans-Land. Hence the their purported “7.3%” Israeli proposal is actually 9.2% of the West Bank. Similarly, and their insistence on retaining “80%” of the settlers is actually closer to 90%.
  •   Israeli emphasis on percentages further misses the point. The overall impact of a proposal cannot be measured in percentages alone. In fact,Moreover, the location and quality of the territory that taken is no less important than the amountIsrael wants to annex is the issue, notoften more important than its size. For example, while the annexation of evenEast Jerusalem iscomprises just aboveover 1% of the West Bankof the West Bank,but if its annexation by Israel wants to annex only it consists of East Jerusalem, that would render such a state still be completely nonviable.unacceptable to Palestinians. 
  •  The Israel?si side?s insistence on retaining the vast majority of its facts on the ground is unacceptableboth unreasonable and impractical. In effect, this means that Israel?s ending point is the same as its starting point, since Israel was prepared to evacuate unilaterally the same settlements it now proposes to evacuate as part of negotiated agreement.  Furthermore, Tthose “facts on the ground”, most of which were created with the express aim of preventing expressly to prevent a Palestinian contiguity and/orstate from becoming. Following is a Palestinian state, is both impractical and illogical. Here, it is worth quoting directly from the WZO Settlement Division?s “Master Plan for the Development of Settlementsquote in Judea and Samaria” (“Drobles Plan”, September 1980):

“It is therefore significant to stress today, mainly by means of actions, that the autonomy does not and will not apply to the territories but only to the Arab population thereof. This should mainly find expression by establishing facts on the ground. Therefore, the state-owned lands and the uncultivated barren lands in Judea and Samaria ought to be seized right away, with the purpose of settling the areas between and around the centers occupied by the minorities so as to reduce to the minimum the danger of an additional Arab state being established in these territories. Being cut off by Jewish settlements the minority population will find it difficult to form a territorial and political continuity.”

 

  1.  Interests and Criteria

 

In addition to securing and safeguarding fundamental Palestinian rights, Palestinians are also guided by an interests-based approach to the negotiations.  As such, Palestinians remain cognizant ofacknowledge and are prepared to accommodate the legitimate interests of Israel,  such as their attachment to Jerusalem, security and minimizing the political and economic cost of the evacuation.3  

 

However, since the agreed goal of this process is to create an independent, sovereign, viable and contiguous Palestinian state, and whereas Israel already had a viable state for 19 years before occupying the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian needs and interests should take precedence over those of Israel. Moreover, in addition to sustaining a future state, Palestinians also require sufficient space and resources to reverse the processes of de-development and dispossession resulting from 41 years of occupation.

 

Palestinian flexibility and willingness to accommodate Israeli interests, however, cannot be at the expense of their own interests.  Consequently, our assessment is based on the need to protect the following core interests:

 

  •  Securing East Jerusalem as the future capital of the state of Palestine;
  •  Ensuring the territorial contiguity of the state,
  •  Ensuring the economic viability of the state, and
  •  Protecting the independence and sovereignty of the state.

 

However, since these are largely subjective in nature, we have developed a set of objective criteria by which to analyze the current Israeli proposal (or any future ones).  In addition to the basic principles of (1) a one-to-one swap equal in both size and value, and (2) the unacceptability of swapping of land inhabited by Palestinians (on either side of the 1967)4, we used the following swap criteria:

 

  •  proximity to 1967 line
    •  impact on East Jerusalem (urban and metropolitan area)
    •  impact on urban/rural development
    •  agricultural value
    •  roads
    •  water sensitivity
    •  archaeological value/sites
    •  private property rights

 

 

  1.  Analysis of Israeli Proposal

 

The Israeli side has proposed a land swap whereby it would annex “7.3%” of the West Bank, according to its calculation, in exchange for the equivalent of 5.0% from Israeli territory. The remaining 2.3% would be allocated to the “safe passage” linking the Gaza Strip with the West Bank. In addition, as part of the package, the Israelis have offered Palestinians use of its seaport at Ashdod (presumably in lieu of their own seaport in Gaza).  In reality, however, since Israel excludes from its calculation areas that it illegally annexed in and around East Jerusalem and the Latrun no-man?s-land, the actual land area proposed to be annexed is 9.2% of West Bank.  Taken as a whole, therefore, the Israeli proposal represents a swap ratio of nearly 2:1 (520 km2 from Palestine versus 276 km2 from Israel).

 

  1.  National Impact

 

The Israeli proposal is completely unworkable given its inordinate impact at the national, regional and local levels on Palestinian territorial contiguity, economic viability and East Jerusalem and other basic interests.  (see table below)

 

Table 1: SummareySummary of National Impact

Indicator

Figure

Note

Total Area to be Annexed

520 km2

9.2% of West Bank

    of which slated for Pal. urban growth

XX km2

YYYYY

    of which Agricultural Land

172 km2

9% of total agr land in WB

    of which olive groves

58 km2

8% of total olive groves in WB

Distance from 1967 Line (maximum)

22 km

Almost half the width of WB

Total Settlers to be Annexed

414,000

88% of settler population5

Palestinian pop. in enclaves/semi-enclaves

167,000

7% of WB Pal population

Palestinian pop. directly affected

761,000

30% of WB Pal population

 

The Israeli proposal has its greatest impact overall on Palestinian East Jerusalem, both the city itself and the Metropolitan Jerusalem area as a whole., which Although the Israeli side has never presented their proposed border in the Jerusalem area, even if we assume that they intend to withdraw from most or all of the major Palestinian population centers in and around the city, East Jerusalem would still be severely fragmented internally, both territorially and demographically, as well as isolated from the rest of the West Bank.  This would fact alone effectively renders the proposed Palestinian state nonviable since the Jerusalem metropolitan area, which ias the epicenter of the West Bank economy, accounts for over one-third of the West Bank?s economy.

 

In addition, the Israeli proposal:

  •  Severely hinders prospects for urban development and growth in several Palestinian cities, mainly East Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Qalqilya and Salfit, as well numerous smaller towns and villages in these governorates, including the creation of numerous non-viable enclaves and semi-enclaves (e.g., Deir Ballut/Zawiya, Bir Nabala/Jib, etc.).
    •  Isolates the cities of East Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Qalqilya and Salfit from most of their agricultural/rural hinterlands, which rely on these urban centers for employment, markets, education, health and other vital services.
    •  Deprives Palestinians of major transportation arteries of the West Bank (e.g., Roads #1, #5, #55, #60, etc.) leading to increased travel times and transaction costs, which would further impede regional commerce and other economic activities.
    •  Severely impairs the Palestinian agricultural sector, in many cases depriving Palestinian villages of most or all of their cultivated lands and/or water resources, particularly in Qalqilya and Salfit governorates, but also in western Jerusalem and Bethlehem governorates. Increased social dislocation in rural areas would increase pressure on already restricted urban centers, creating a cycle of social marginalization and economic demise.
    •  Annexes a large portion of the areas that are particularly productive in terms of water abstraction. This severely curtails Palestine?s ability to independently abstract its share of the water sources it is entitled to under international law and makes Palestine vulnerable to Israeli good will to supply that share.

 

  1.  Regional Impact

 

The Territory Team conducted four joint field visits with their Israeli counterparts, covering the following geographic areas:

(1) the nNorth-Ccentral West Bank, mainly Salfit and Qalqilya governorates (Ariel/Shomron): (2) the Latrun area in western Ramallah (Modi?in ?Illit);

(3) Eeastern Jerusalem governorate (Ma?ale Adumim), and

(4) Wwestern Bethlelhem (Gush Etzion).  

 

Although the Israeli proposal includes additional West Bank territory that it seeks to annex (both with and without settlements), this analysis focuses primarily on the four regions that we visited and that are noted above.

 

 Of these four regions, the two most problematic areas in the Israeli proposal ?and ultimately unworkable given their inordinate impact on basic Palestinian interests?areas in the Israeli proposal are Qalqilya/Salfit and the Jerusalem metropolitan area.

 

  1.  Area 1:  North-Central West Bank (Ariel/Shomron)

 

The Israeli proposal in the north-central West Bank consists primarily of two large settlement “fingers” (Ariel/Shmoron) each of which penetrate no less than 20 km deep into Palestinian territory ? almost half the width of the West Bank.  The bulk of these areas lie in Qalqilya and Salfit governorates, with significant intrusions in Tulkarem in the north (Sal?it settlement) and Ramallah in the south (Bet Aryeh and Ofarim settlements) as well.  

 

Approximately 60,500 000 settlers currently live in this area, which contains some 28 separate settlements, including at least four industrial settlements.  By comparison, there are approximately 178180,000 Palestinians living in this area in some 60 localities, nearly all of which would be directly affected by the annexation of these areas, either in terms of their urban/rural development, or loss of agricultural lands, water resources or access to key road links.  (Ssee table below)

 

Regional Impact:  North-Central West Bank

Indicator

Figure

Note

Total Area to be Annexed

190 km2

3.4% of West Bank

    of which slated for Pal. urban growth

2.3 km2

42% of the total area reserved for future expansion

    of which Agricultural Land

80 km2

 

    of which olive groves

47 km2

60% of olive groves in this area

Distance from 1967 line

22 km

Almost half the width of WB

Total Settlers to be Annexed

60,000

13% of settler population

Palestinian pop. in enclaves/semi-enclaves

100,000

 

Palestinian pop. directlyDirectly affected

180,000

Pal proposal affects only 20,000

  •  The annexation of the Ariel and Shomron “fingers” would severely undermine?if not destroy altogether?Palestinian territorial contiguity in the northern West Bank.  Indeed, under the Israeli proposal, both Salfit and Qalqilya governorates would each be territorially fragmented into four separate geographic areas.
    •  In terms of urban development, the Israeli proposal would severely constrict the expansion of Qalqilya (pop. 48,000) and Salfit (pop. 10,500) cities, the two principle cities in the region.
      •  The city of Qalqilya in particular, which is already nearly completely encircled by the Wall within an area of just 9.4 km2, would be permanently deprived of virtually any space for future expansion or development. To understand the future impact of the Israeli proposal on the city of Qalqilya, we need only look at the dramatic socioeconomic decline that has taken place during the past several years since the construction of the Wall.  In the last year alone (July 2007-June 2008), some 15% of the nearly 5,000 commercial establishments shops in Qalqilya governorate the vast majority in Qalqilya City itself, have closed.6 
      •  The city of Salfit (pop. 10,500) faces a similar if less dramatic fate under the Israeli proposal. Due to the topographic and hydrologic characteristics of the Salfit area, the only reasonable direction for Salfit to expand is to the north and west, adjacent to Ariel and inside the settlement?s master plan area, all of which is would be lost under the Israeli proposal.
        •  The same holds for numerous smaller towns and villages in the region, many of which face even more extreme restrictions on their rural development under the Israeli proposal.  In addition to fact, both Salfit and Qalqilya governorates would each be territorially fragmenteding Salfit and Qalqilya governorates into four numerous separate geographic areas. Moreover, the Israeli proposal would create several Palestinian enclaves and semi-enclaves that are wholly unsustainable area.
          •  In one such area, the villages of Az-Zawiya, Rafat and Deir Ballut (total pop. 11,800) in western Salfit would be completely encircled from all sides. The area is already slated to be encircled by the approved Wall route, with only two inferior road outlets (one through the tunnelled link between Habla and Qalqilya and the other through a planned future road link from Bidya to Deir Istiya). However, under the Israeli proposal, the enclave would be reduced even further more or less to the built-up areas, resulting in the loss of virtually all of their agricultural lands, as well as any areas for rural expansion or development.
          •  The nearby village of ?Azzun ?Itma (pop. 1,800) faces a similar existential threat.  Although it is currently slated to become another enclave by the Wall, the map presented by the Israelis did not indicate a line around ?Azzun ?Itma, presumably to allow for the eventual connection between Oranit and Elqana-Etz Efrayim. However, aside from indicating that the village would not be annexed, [CITE STATS]the Israelis did not have an answer as to what would happen to ?Azzun ?Itma.
          •  Numerous other villages in the area would face similar threats to their viability or existence resulting from the loss of their cultivated lands, disabled rural development and road deprivation, including Jinsafut (pop. 2,400), Haris (pop. 3,300), Deir Istiya (pop. 4,100) and others.
    •  In economic terms, both Qalqilya and Salfit governorates are dominated by the agricultural sector, which would be severely debilitated under the Israeli proposal. Moreover, the combination of agricultural debilitation and its resultant social dislocation, and the already severe restrictions on urban development would lead to increased marginalization and ghettoization and compound the socioeconomic demise of these areas. In Qalqilya for example, an area once considered the “breadbasket” of the West Bank, both Qalqilya and the neighboring villages are separated from almost all of their agricultural land.  
      •  For example, in the village of Jayyus, with a population of roughly 3,500, most of whom rely on farming for their livelihoods, approximately two-thirds of the village land and all six of its water wells are currently located west of the Wall. Needless to say, this situation would be rendered permanent by the Israeli proposal, in which case the limited (and ever-diminishing) number of Palestinian farmers who are currently able to obtain the requisite access permits from the Israeli army would be permanently cut off from their cultivated lands. As a result, large numbers of Palestinians from Jayyus and other similarly affected agricultural villages would be forced to leave their homes in search of new sources of livelihood. This, in turn, would put greater pressure on Qalqilya and other nearby cities, which are already facing sever limitations on their own development.
      •  The governorate of Salfit, which is even more dependent on agriculture, would be harder hit still.  Approximately, 80% of Salfit?s area of 205 km2 is comprised of agricultural land, most of which is planted with olive trees. Under the Israeli proposal, approximately 45% of Salfit?s area (92.7 km2) and 46% of Salfit?s agricultural land would be permanently lost.
    •  In terms of roads and transportation, in both Qalqilya and Salfit governorates, the Israeli proposal would annex, in whole or in part, virtually all of the main roads, particularly Roads #505, #5 and #446 in Salfit and Road #55 in Qalqilya. These roads are essential for sustaining regional commerce and other economic activities, as well as the provision of basic social services such health, between small villages nearby urban centers, particularly Nablus, the main commercial center in the northern West Bank.
    •  In addition, this region is a prime water productive zone.  Hence, the more Israel is allowed to annex in this area, especially close to the 1967 line, the more dependent Palestine becomes on Israel to supply it with water. (NOTE: Ariel, by itself, does not affect water security per se, as it does not have major water productive zones. Rather it is the large area to the west of Ariel, which would be needed to connect it with Israel, that is important from a water perspective.)

 

The Case of Ariel Settlement

 

  •  The settlement of Ariel, separate and apart from other settlements Israel seeks to annex in the area, poses a particularly severe and insurmountable threat to Palestinian local, regional and national interests. Thus, even if we assume that Ariel could be annexed in isolation, connected to Israel only by a road, this would not eliminate its overwhelming negative impact, either in terms of territorial contiguity and the economic viability of the Palestinian state.
    •  As noted previously, Ariel directly prohibits the natural expansion and development of Salfit city, while severing it from its agricultural and rural hinterland to the north, northwest and west.
    •  Several Salfit villages, most notably Haris, Kifl Haris, Marda and Deir Istiya north of Ariel, would lose precious cultivated lands, especially olive groves, on which the local populations rely for their livelihoods.
    •  Since it is situated some 20 km east of the 1967 border, virtually in the center of the West Bank, along Road #505 (“Trans-Samaria Highway”), Ariel effectively severs the northern West Bank in two. Thus, any surface connection of Ariel to Israel would cause a disproportionate, and most likely irremediable, disruption of movement and access for nearly all of the towns and villages in Salfit governorate, as well as Salfit?s connection to the north (Nablus/Jenin) and northeast (Qalqilya/Tulkarem).

 

  •  If the primary Israeli interest is to minimize the number of settlers who would need to be evacuated, there is even less justification for annexing a settlement as harmful as Ariel, as the Palestinian proposal would allow Israel to retain approximately 19,000 settlers in this region while the total population of Ariel population is slightly more than 16,000.

 

 

  1.  Area 2:  Latrun Area (Modi?in Illit)

Regional Impact:  Latrun Area

Indicator

Figure

Note

Total Area to be Annexed

74 km2

1.3% of WB

    of which slated for Pal. urban growth

XX km2

 

    of which Agricultural Land

29 km2

 

    of which olive groves

XX km2

 

Distance from 1967 line

XX km

 

Total Settlers to be Annexed

52,000

11% of settler population

Palestinian Pop. in enclaves/semi-enclaves

n/a (?)

 

Palestinian Pop. directly affected

27,000

 

  •  The Israeli proposal annexes the sites of three Palestinian villages destroyed and depopulated in 1967 (Imwas, Yalu, and Beit Nuba). The return of these villages to Palestinian sovereignty is of paramount importance if the Palestinians are to feel that their painful compromise of accepting to exercise their right to self-determination on only 22% of historic Palestine was not in vain.
    •  The Latrun area is by far the most valuable water productive zone in the West Bank. Hence, Tthe more landextent to which Israel is allowed to annex in this area the more adverse the will affect on Palestinian water security.

 

  1.  Area 3:  Jerusalem Metropolitan Area (focus on Ma?ale Adumim)

The Israeli proposal for the Jerusalem area represents the single most problematic aspect of its proposal overall.  For Palestinians, Jerusalem is not only a cultural and religious symbol of Palestinian nationhood, it is also the economic, social and political center of Palestinian life. Moreover, when speaking of Jerusalem as a Palestinian capital, we are referring to it not just in terms of its urban center, but as cohesive, integrated metropolitan unit.

 

As with any other state, Palestine will require not only a physical presence in its capital city, but adequate space for residential and commercial development, employment creation and social services, as well as the necessary transportation links to its outlying suburban areas and rural hinterland.  This is particularly true for East Jerusalem, whereby in addition to being the social, cultural, religious capital of Palestinian life, Metropolitan Jerusalem, which includes Ramallah and Bethlehem, represents the socioeconomic center of Palestinian life, comprising some 30-35% of its national economy.  

 

While the Israeli side has never presented an exact line or border in Jerusalem, their insistence on annexing all of the settlements within its unilaterally and illegally annexed Jerusalem municipality, as well as the two large settlement “blocs” of Giv?at Zeev and Ma?ale Adumim would result in the encirclement and isolation of East Jerusalem from the rest of Palestine, as well as permanently sever the natural, historic, religious and socioeconomic connections between East Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem.  

 

Thus, even assuming that Israel will return all or most of the major Palestinian population centers in and around East Jerusalem for its own “demographic” purposes, Jerusalem would remain deeply fragmented, both territorially and demographically, and ultimately unsustainable.  As such, there would be no chance for establishing a functioning Palestinian capital in Jerusalem, without which there can be no viable Palestinian state.  

Regional Impact:  Jerusalem Metropolitan Area

Indicator

Figure

Note

Total Area to be Annexed

171 km2

3% of WB

    of which slated for Pal. urban growth

XX km2

 

    of which Agricultural Land

36 km2

 

    of which olive groves

XX km2

 

Distance from 1967 line

13 km

Almost half the width of WB

Total Settlers to be Annexed

250,000

53% of settler population

Palestinian Pop. in enclaves/semi-enclaves

45,000

excluding those inside Israeli-defined Jerusalem municipality

Palestinian Pop. directly affected

450,000

18% of WB Pal. population

Pal proposal affects 320,000

 

  •  The Israeli proposal leaves no room for the natural growth of East Jerusalem itself, and severely restricts urban/rural development of most of the surrounding towns and villages, including the cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem, which together with East Jerusalem comprise the single integrated socioeconomic unit of Metropolitan Jerusalem.
    •  In particular, Giv?at Zeev and its six satellite settlements (Bet Horon, Giv?on, Giv?on HaHadasha and Har Shmuel ? pop. 12,900 settlers), severs the link between the villages of western Jerusalem Governorate, which is Jerusalem?s main agricultural hinterland and for whom Jerusalem is their main socioeconomic hub.  In addition, it would severely limit expansion of Palestinian villages in the area, depriving them both areas of prospective residential development and their agricultural lands. [CITE EXAMPLES/STATS]
    •  At the same time, in addition to severing its natural socioeconomic ties to East Jerusalem, the city of Ramallah would be cut off from many of the localities it serves, affecting approximately 50,000 Palestinians, as well as physically hemmed in from the south and east and cut off.  In much the same way, the nearby town sub-regional center of Ar-Ram, would be severed from the roughly 35,000 Palestinians it serves in nearby localities.

 

  •  Though an exact line in northern part of Jerusalem was never presented, the inclusion of Geva? Binyamin, Kochav Binyamin, Sha?ar Binymin and Pesagot settlements, as well as current realities on the ground (e.g., Qalandia terminal), suggest that Israel seeks to retain the Atarot industrial settlement and the Qalandia Airport, which would also necessitate the annexation of Road #404 to Jerusalem. This would create serious problems of contiguity and planning for much of the northern Jerusalem Governorate, especially in conjunction with the annexation of Neve Ya?qov/Pisgat Zeev, since Beit Hanina village, Shu?fat, Al-Jib and Bir Nabala, which would remain encircled on three sides, can only expand to the west.

 

  •  Likewise, the settlement of Har Homa (~7,200 settlers), along with its smaller companion settlement of Giv?at HaMatos (~300 settlers), would have a similar impact on East Jerusalem from the south.  Setting aside the fact that it was established in 1998 at the height of the Oslo peace process, and hence a show of bad faith, the Israeli proposal to annex Har Homa would:
    •  Severely restrict Bethlehem?s development/expansion to the north as well as Bethlehem?s natural area for Bethlehem?s development is to the north or south, but not west, which is its agricultural hinterland. (see Bethlehem below)
    •  Sever Bethlehem?s historic, religious and socioeconomic connection to East Jerusalem, which dates back more than 2,000 years.  This is more than merely symbolic since both Bethlehem and Jerusalem, and the link between them, rely on tourism (particularly religious tourism) and associated economic activities for their economic survival.

 

The Case of Ma?ale Adumim

  •  The case of Ma?ale Adumim (including its five satellite settlements and the planned “E-1” expansion area) is particularly egregious in terms of its impact on Palestinian interests, including urban development, contiguity and roads, as well as the viability of Palestinian Jerusalem itself. In short, the annexation of Ma?ale Adumim would severely disable prospects for economic rehabilitation, as well as restrict growth of the future Palestinian capital.
    •  In addition to taking half of the land earmarked for East Jerusalem?s future growth and development, the Israeli proposal for Ma?ale Adumim deprives Palestinians of vital road links (Roads # 1 and #60) and reaches half the distance to the Jordanian border and up to the Jordan Valley rift and, thus effectively severing the West Bank in half.  This would also greatly disrupt the Palestinian connection to Jordan/Arab world via the east.
    •  Furthermore, Metropolitan Jerusalem to be viable, there must be contiguity between East Jerusalem and its primary suburban areas, namely Eizariya, Az-Za?ayim, Issawiya, Anata, Hizma and Ar-Ram. The inclusion of Ma?ale Adumim, combined with the proposed Geva? Binyamin-Pesagot “finger”, would completely isolate these areas from East Jerusalem and fragment them into four separate geographic areas.
  •  Even assuming a scenario whereby only the settlement of Ma?aleh Adumim is annexed (i.e., minus its five satellite settlements), this would do little to mitigate the adverse impacts on East Jerusalem.  
    •  Given Ma?aleh Adumim?s strategic location in the geographic center of the West Bank and along the Jerusalem-Jordan Valley corridor, as well as its relative size (outer limit area = 11 km2), such a scenario would still result in the isolation of East Jerusalem from the north and east, the elimination of precious reserves for its own expansion and development and effectively cut the West Bank in two.  
    •  The main problem with Ma?aleh Adumim therefore is not the inclusion of its five satellite settlements, which together barely comprise 10% of the population of the so-called Adumim “bloc”, but Ma?aleh Adumim itself, along with the “E-1” corridor that would inevitably be needed to physically connect it with Israel.  This is precisely why the international community, most notably the United States, has consistently objected to Israeli construction in the E-1 area.  
    •  Even if we assume that E-1 is not annexed, and that Ma?aleh Adumim is connected to Israel by a single road (i.e., “string and balloon” scenario), the parts of Issawiya, At-Tur and Eizariya villages that lie within E-1, and which comprise the ideal location for East Jerusalem?s future expansion and development, would still be physically cut off from the city. This would be exacerbated by the numerous and multi-layered “security” restrictions that Israel would undoubtedly seek to impose along such a road.  

 

  1.  Area 4:  Western Bethlehem (Gush Etzion)

 

Although Bethlehem is an integral part of Palestinian Metropolitan Jerusalem, for purposes of clarity only, it is considered separately in this analysis. The Israeli proposal in the Bethlehem region poses similar problems as in Jerusalem and the North-Central West Bank, though perhaps somewhat less severe.

 

In addition to cutting nearly 9 km deep into the West Bank, the area that Israel seeks to annex in western Bethlehem governorate (i.e., “Gush Etzion”) would severely hamper prospects for economic rehabilitation over the short-term and economic development, both in Bethlehem governorate (as well as Metropolitan Jerusalem as a whole) by annexing large tracts of empty land, thus depriving it of it a substantial proportion of its cultivated lands (i.e., valuable cash-crops), as well as badly needed space for urban and economic development (particularly cultural/religious and landscape tourism).

Regional Impact:  Western Bethlehem

Indicator

Figure

Note

Total Area to be Annexed

69 km2

1.2% of West Bank

    of which slated for Pal. urban growth

XX km2

 

    of which Agricultural Land

27 km2

 

    of which vineyards

11 km2

41% of vineyards in this area

Distance from 1967 line

10 km

 

Total Settlers to be Annexed

49,000

10% of settler population

Palestinian Pop. in enclaves/semi-enclaves

22,000

 

Palestinian Pop. directly affected

100,000

4% of WB Pal population

Pal proposal affects only 15,000

  •  The Israeli proposal would severely restrict Bethlehem?s (along with its sister cities, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour) urban development from the north and west. As noted previously, Bethlehem?s natural expansion for urban, residential and commercial development  lies to the north or south, as an expansion to the west would encroach on its agricultural hinterland.
  •  Similarly, the isolation of four Palestinian villages west of Bethlehem (Walaja, Nahhalin, Hussan, and Battir ? pop. ~20,000) from their social and economic hub in Bethlehem, as well as from one another, would deprive Bethlehem of its primary agricultural hinterland, as well as pose an existential threat these villages themselves.  In addition to being deprived of their primary livelihood (i.e., agriculture) and their primary urban center, these villages would be effectively turned into non-viable enclaves/semi-enclaves.
  •  The proposal would also rob Palestinians in the Bethlehem area of crucial road links, most notably Road # 60, which connects Bethlehem to Jerusalem and to Hebron (and ultimately Gaza), thus further restricting access to jobs, markets, essential public services, and increasing travel distances/times and transaction costs.
  •  The settlements of Efrat (pop. 8,000) and Migdal ?Oz (pop. 350), in particular, whose negative impact on Palestinians are grossly out of proportion to their size, are far too severe allow their annexation:
    •  Only 8,000 settlers would need to be evacuated, as compared with 40,000+ in Etzion who would be able to remain.
    •  Would sever the main Bethlehem-Hebron road link (#60). Any new/alternate road should be built for settlement areas included in the swap (i.e., only after such a swap is agreed).
    •  Would nearly double the amount of active cultivation that is lost, which is essential to the regional economy.
    •  Would restrict Bethlehem?s development/expansion to the south. (Natural area for Bethlehem?s development is to the north or south, but not west, which is its agricultural hinterland.)